table of contents
        
      
      
    - Tumbleweed 4.4.38-1.2
 - Leap-16.0
 - Leap-15.6
 
| CRYPT(3) | Library Functions Manual | CRYPT(3) | 
NAME¶
crypt, crypt_r,
    crypt_rn, crypt_ra —
    passphrase hashing
LIBRARY¶
Crypt Library (libcrypt, -lcrypt)
SYNOPSIS¶
#include
  <crypt.h>
char *
  
  crypt(const char *phrase,
    const char *setting);
char *
  
  crypt_r(const char *phrase,
    const char *setting, struct crypt_data
    *data);
char *
  
  crypt_rn(const char *phrase,
    const char *setting, struct crypt_data
    *data, int size);
char *
  
  crypt_ra(const char *phrase,
    const char *setting, void
    **data, int *size);
DESCRIPTION¶
The crypt,
    crypt_r, crypt_rn, and
    crypt_ra functions irreversibly “hash”
    phrase for storage in the system password database
    (shadow(5)) using a cryptographic “hashing
    method.” The result of this operation is called a “hashed
    passphrase” or just a “hash.” Hashing methods are
    described in crypt(5).
setting controls which hashing method to use, and also supplies various parameters to the chosen method, most importantly a random “salt” which ensures that no two stored hashes are the same, even if the phrase strings are the same.
The data argument to
    crypt_r is a structure of type
    struct crypt_data. It has at least these fields:
struct crypt_data {
    char output[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
    char setting[CRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
    char input[CRYPT_MAX_PASSPHRASE_SIZE];
    char initialized;
};
Upon a successful return from crypt_r, the
    hashed passphrase will be stored in output.
    Applications are encouraged, but not required, to use the
    input and setting fields to
    store the strings that they will pass as input phrase
    and setting to crypt_r. This
    will make it easier to erase all sensitive data after it is no longer
    needed.
The initialized field must be
    set to zero before the first time a struct crypt_data
    object is first used in a call to
    crypt_r().
    We recommend zeroing the entire object, not just
    initialized and not just the documented fields, before
    the first use. (Of course, do this before storing anything in
    setting and input.)
The data argument to
    crypt_rn should also point to a
    struct crypt_data object, and
    size should be the size of that object, cast to
    int. When used with crypt_rn,
    the entire data object (except for the
    input and setting fields) must
    be zeroed before its first use; this is not just a recommendation, as it is
    for crypt_r. Otherwise, the fields of the object
    have the same uses that they do for crypt_r.
On the first call to crypt_ra,
    data should be the address of a void
    * variable set to NULL, and size should be the
    address of an int variable set to zero.
    crypt_ra will allocate and initialize a
    struct crypt_data object, using
    malloc(3), and write its address and size into the
    variables pointed to by data and
    size. These can be reused in subsequent calls. After
    the application is done hashing passphrases, it should deallocate the
    struct crypt_data object using
    free(3).
RETURN VALUES¶
Upon successful completion, crypt,
    crypt_r, crypt_rn, and
    crypt_ra return a pointer to a string which encodes
    both the hashed passphrase, and the settings that were used to encode it.
    This string is directly usable as setting in other
    calls to crypt, crypt_r,
    crypt_rn, and crypt_ra, and
    as prefix in calls to
    crypt_gensalt,
    crypt_gensalt_rn, and
    crypt_gensalt_ra. It will be entirely printable
    ASCII, and will not contain whitespace or the characters
    ‘:’,
    ‘;’,
    ‘*’,
    ‘!’, or
    ‘\’. See crypt(5)
    for more detail on the format of hashed passphrases.
crypt places its result in a static
    storage area, which will be overwritten by subsequent calls to
    crypt. It is not safe to call
    crypt from multiple threads simultaneously.
crypt_r, crypt_rn,
    and crypt_ra place their result in the
    output field of their data
    argument. It is safe to call them from multiple threads simultaneously, as
    long as a separate data object is used for each
    thread.
Upon error, crypt_r,
    crypt_rn, and crypt_ra write
    an invalid hash
    to the output field of their
    data argument, and crypt
    writes an invalid hash to its static storage area. This string will be
    shorter than 13 characters, will begin with a
    ‘*’, and will not compare equal to
    setting.
Upon error, crypt_rn and
    crypt_ra return a null pointer.
    crypt_r and crypt may also
    return a null pointer, or they may return a pointer to the invalid hash,
    depending on how libcrypt was configured. (The option to return the invalid
    hash is for compatibility with old applications that assume that
    crypt cannot return a null pointer. See
    PORTABILITY NOTES below.)
All four functions set errno when they fail. When the functions succeed, the value of errno is unspecified and must not be relied upon.
ERRORS¶
EINVAL- setting is invalid, or requests a hashing method that is not supported.
 ERANGE- phrase is too long (more than
      
CRYPT_MAX_PASSPHRASE_SIZEcharacters; some hashing methods may have lower limits).
crypt_rnonly: size is too small for the hashing method requested by setting. ENOMEM- Failed to allocate internal scratch memory.
    
crypt_raonly: failed to allocate memory for data. ENOSYSorEOPNOTSUPP- Hashing passphrases is not supported at all on this installation, or the hashing method requested by setting is not supported. These error codes are not used by this version of libcrypt, but may be encountered on other systems.
 
PORTABILITY NOTES¶
crypt is included in POSIX, but
    crypt_r, crypt_rn, and
    crypt_ra are not part of any standard.
POSIX does not specify any hashing methods, and does not require hashed passphrases to be portable between systems. In practice, hashed passphrases are portable as long as both systems support the hashing method that was used. However, the set of supported hashing methods varies considerably from system to system.
The behavior of crypt on errors isn't well
    standardized. Some implementations simply can't fail (except by crashing the
    program), others return a null pointer or a fixed string. Most
    implementations don't set errno, but some do. POSIX
    specifies returning a null pointer and setting errno,
    but it defines only one possible error, ENOSYS, in
    the case where crypt is not supported at all. Some
    older applications are not prepared to handle null pointers returned by
    crypt. The behavior described above for this
    implementation, setting errno and returning an invalid
    hash different from setting, is chosen to make these
    applications fail closed when an error occurs.
Due to historical restrictions on the export of cryptographic
    software from the USA, crypt is an optional POSIX
    component. Applications should therefore be prepared for
    crypt not to be available, or to always fail
    (setting errno to ENOSYS) at
    runtime.
POSIX specifies that crypt is declared in
    <unistd.h>, but only if the
    macro _XOPEN_CRYPT is defined and has a value
    greater than or equal to zero. Since libcrypt does not provide
    <unistd.h>, it declares
    crypt, crypt_r,
    crypt_rn, and crypt_ra in
    <crypt.h> instead.
On a minority of systems (notably recent versions of Solaris),
    crypt uses a thread-specific static storage buffer,
    which makes it safe to call from multiple threads simultaneously, but does
    not prevent each call within a thread from overwriting the results of the
    previous one.
BUGS¶
Some implementations of crypt, upon error,
    return an invalid hash that is stored in a read-only location or only
    initialized once, which means that it is only safe to erase the buffer
    pointed to by the crypt return value if an error did
    not occur.
struct crypt_data may be quite large (32kB in this implementation of libcrypt; over 128kB in some other implementations). This is large enough that it may be unwise to allocate it on the stack.
Some recently designed hashing methods need even more scratch
    memory, but the crypt_r interface makes it
    impossible to change the size of struct crypt_data
    without breaking binary compatibility. The crypt_rn
    interface could accommodate larger allocations for specific hashing methods,
    but the caller of crypt_rn has no way of knowing how
    much memory to allocate. crypt_ra does the
    allocation itself, but can only make a single call to
    malloc(3).
ATTRIBUTES¶
For an explanation of the terms used in this section, see attributes(7).
| Interface | Attribute | Value | 
| crypt | Thread safety | MT-Unsafe race:crypt | 
| crypt_r , crypt_rn , crypt_ra | Thread safety | MT-Safe | 
HISTORY¶
A rotor-based crypt function appeared in
    Version 6 AT&T UNIX. The
    “traditional” DES-based crypt first
    appeared in Version 7 AT&T UNIX.
crypt_r originates with the GNU C Library.
    There's also a crypt_r function on HP-UX and MKS
    Toolkit, but the prototypes and semantics differ.
crypt_rn and
    crypt_ra originate with the Openwall project.
SEE ALSO¶
crypt_gensalt(3), getpass(3), getpwent(3), shadow(3), login(1), passwd(1), crypt(5), passwd(5), shadow(5), pam(8)
| October 11, 2017 | Openwall Project |